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Productivity Levels and Productivity Change Under Unionism
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how unions affect the rate ofproductivity change over
time. The direction of union impact cannot be predicted from economictheory.
Firms may tend to select more productive technologies to offset thecost of
higher union wages or they may tend to select less productive technologies to
keep union wage demands in line. Evidence from manufacturing indicates that
unions have not affected productivity growth, but in the constructionindustry
productivity growth has been much slower in areas where there is a high initial
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Roughly 10 years ago researchers started to produce quantitative estimates
of the impact of unionism across cross sections of firms or industries. The
results of this research, summarized in Freeman and Medoff (1984), show that in
most instances productivity is much higher at a given point in time under
unionism.
These studies have not considered the question of how unions affect
productivity over time. The use of cross section data sets has largely
precluded the examination of this set of issues, with one notable exception.
Connerton, Freeman and Medoff (1983) use repeated cross sections and find that
productivity in union bituminous coal mines was 33 to 38 percent higher than in
nonunion mines in 1965, but 14 to 20 percent lower in 1975 and 1980. They
attribute the decline of the union coefficient to the deterioration of
labor-management relations during that time period, a perfectly legitimate
inference given the theoretical framework within which all of these studies
(including, of course, my own) has been embedded. The exit-voice model
emphasizes turnover, training, and labor-management interaction, but pays scant
attention to such dynamic factors as investment in R&D, lags in adopting new
techniques, and organizational change.
This paper examines how unions affect the rate of productivity change over
time. Considering both price theoretic and institutional factors, the impact
of unionism on productivity change cannot be predicted ex ante. Just as in the
case of cross section union-nonunion differences in productivity levels, the
question of whether unions promote or retard productivity change is an
empirical issue. The evidence reported below indicates that unions have had no2
impact on productivity change in manufacturing, whereas in construction
productivity growth has been much slower under unionism.
II. PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE UNDER UNIONISM
In cross section analyses union-nonunion productivity differences can arise
through union effects on turnover, training, work rules, labor-management
communication, worker morale, and management behavior. Using a Cobb-Douglas
production function Qt=(+cUt)LtaKtb, the net impact of all of these sources
of productivity differences between union and nonunion observations in a cross
section can be determined by estimating the parameter c. Suppose now that two
cross section data sets are available. Then after taking log differences, the
parameter c can also be estimated with the equation
dlog(Q/L) =c*dUt+b*dlog(K/L)+(a+bl)*dlogL. (1)
In this specification, productivity changes are entirely a function of changes
in percentage unionized, the capital-labor ratio, and establishment size. If
the model has been correctly specified and if there is no measurement error in
the data set, one should get the same estimate of c from either the conven-
tional cross section equation or the log difference equation (1).
The parameter c in (1) is assumed to be constant in each period. This
assumption is inappropriate whenever productivity shocks occur within either
the union or nonunion sector. For instance, if relations between labor and
management deteriorate, as was the case in the bituminous coal industry in the
period examined by Connerton, Freeman, and Medoff, one would expect c todecline. Also, c could change as a result of changes in thesources of
union-nonunion productivity differences. For instance, ifchanges are made in
union work rules to allow management greater flexibility inassigning workers
to jobs, this would cause c to rise. If c is allowed tovery over time, the
product of the change in c and the initial level of percentage unionized must
be added to (1):
d1og(Q/L) =ct*dUt+b*dlog(K/L)+(abl)*dlogL+dc*Utl. (2)
The assumption of a constant value of c in (1) is alsoinappropriate when
there is a difference in the rate of technical change between theunion and
nonunion sectors. Let d0 =annualrate of technical change under unionism and
d1 —annualrate of technical change in the nonunion sector. Then the
production function becomes Qt=(÷cUt)LtaKtbexp (doUt+di(l-Ut))t) and the
estimating equation is now
dlog(Q/L) =c*dUt+b*dlog(K/L)+(a+bl)*dlogL
+(dodi)*Ut1+d1t +(dodl)t*dUt. (3)
As one can see from comparing (2) and (3), changes inlabor-management
relations (or other factors which may cause c tovary over time) and unequal
rates of technical change between the union and nonunion sectorsare
econometrically equivalent in terms of their effects on productivity change.
In each case both the initial level of unionization and thechange in
unionization appear on the right hand side of the equation.
Unions are likely to influence productivity change through bothprice
theoretic and institutional mechanisms. Changes in the union-nonunionwage gap
lead to factor substitution decisions that will change laborproductivity, but
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have no effect on total factor productivity. The change in the capital-labor
ratio controls for this spurious source of productivity change in (3).
Union wage behavior becomes a more critical factor when the technology
itself is endogenous. Tauman and Weiss (1984) show that under certain
assumptions unionized firms are more likely to choose the most productive
technology. They consider the case of a duoploy where one firm is unionized
and the other is nonunion. These firms participate in a two-stage
non-cooperative game with the union. In the first stage the firms choose their
technology while the union simultaneously chooses the wage. Output and
employment are determined in the second stage. Both firms initially have the
same technology, but each can purchase and install a more productive technology
at the same cost. Labor is assumed to be the only factor of production, so the
more productive technology must be labor-saving.
The decision to adopt this technology hinges on product demand. At very low
demand levels, neither adopts, and at very high demand levels, both adopt. The
key difference between the union and the nonunion firm is that the union
charges its firm higher wages at high levels of output, while the nonunion
firm pays the same, competitive wage at all output levels. Thus the union firm
stands to gain more than the nonunion firm from adopting the more productive
technology at some output levels and it is possible to have a solution where
only the union firm uses that technology.
This result is very sensitive to the assumption that the union selects its
wage at the same time that the firms select their technologies. If the union
can alter its wage after the technologies have been chosen, it has the ability
to appropriate the returns from the increase in productivity. Realizing this,
the union firm is less likely than the nonunion firm to adopt the best5
technology and it is impossible to have an equilibrium where only the union
firm uses the most productive technology.
Union firms may also want to keep some low productivity capacity in
operation as part of a strategy to keep union wage demands in line. Baldwin
(1983) shows that when the capital replacement cycle is long relative to the
time horizon of the union, in the absence of enforceable longtermwage
contracts, it is optimal to invest in both efficient and inefficient capacity
rather than to invest only in the former. If firms invest only in the most
efficient capacity, they are subject to the risk of higher unionwage demands
in the future, as pointed out by Tauman and Weiss. However, by investing in
both types of capacity, unions will be less likely to make such demands because
some of the less efficient capacity would no longer be profitable to operate
and employment would fall, lowering the union's utility. Although this
strategy results in lower productivity growth in unionized industries, it is
optimal from the standpoint of investors because it guarantees them some return
on new capital investments.
Both the Tauman and Weiss and the Baldwin models are couched in terms of
certain returns to investment in more productive capacity. Nelson (1981) has
emphasized that two key aspects in the process of technical change --
investmentin R&D and the screening and spread of new technology -- involve
considerable uncertainty. Unionized firms engaged in innovative activities
must deal with an additional source of uncertainty, namely the reaction of the
union. In addition to the question of how much of the returns toany sort of
innovative activity (product or process) will have to be shared with the union,
there is also the issue of the willingness of unions to agree to changes in the
production process. The expected returns to innovation may not only be lower6
under unionism, but they may also be more unpredictable. If so, this would
result in an even slower rate of technical change under unionism.
Now consider the institutional effects of unions on productivity growth. In
most cases unions do not attempt to prevent management from introducing new
techniques, mainly because the consequences of doing so are almost always
self-destructive. Two specific cases cited by Bok and Dunlop (1970) are the
attempts of the window-glass workers to stop the glass making machine in 1908
and the efforts of the cigar makers to halt specialization and new machinery.
The window-glass union had to be officially disbanded in 1928 while percentage
unionized in the cigar industry dropped from 45 to 20 percent. Instead of
obstructing new technology, Bok and Dunlop conclude (p.262) that "labor leaders
have normally chosen to accept new methods and share in the gains which these
innovations make possible." A key exception to this general rule, they note,
seems to be the case of "older members with a short, remaining working life and
with little interest in moving or learning new skills, [who] may even find
rational grounds for sacrificing their union in order to prolong their jobs
until retirement (p.262).t'
Even if unions rarely attempt to block the introduction of new technology,
they can still make the introduction of new technology more costly. In almost
every case management must consult with the union before making any changes in
work assignments, skill requirements, number of positions, or plant and
equipment. Slichter, Healy and Livernash (1960) note that this will generally
raise questions regarding craft jurisdiction, seniority, wage adjustments, and
treatment of any displaced workers. Problems are most likely to arise when
management must deal with a number of craft unions simultaneously. Even though
management may at times receive highly valuable input from the union, on7
balance one would expect that the greater cost of introducing new technology
under unionism should make the introduction of such technology less likely than
in a nonunion setting.
However, there are also many cases in which the unions themselves have
actively encouraged firms to make changes that workers believe will lead to
more job security and higher wages. Slichter, Healy, and Livernash note that
such a policy "usually is followed when the union is worried about the ability
of an industry or a plant to hold its own in competition (p.355)." For
instance they point out that the engineering departments of the needle trades
have at times suggested technological changes to employers and assisted the
employer in implementing them, performing a role similar to that of the
extension service in agriculture. Unions also have generated technical
improvements in plants with profit sharing or employee participation programs.
Currently, the growing emphasis on work organization and efficiency in
quality-of-work-life (QWL) programs is another example of unions acting to
promote productivity growth. To the extent that workers feel that they are
more likely to share in the benefits of QWL programs under unionism, those
programs may turn out to be more successful in a union than a nonunion
setting. Thus, the "voice" aspects of union behavior are far from irrelevant
in the analysis of productivity change.
On balance the above discussion indicates that considering both price
theoretic and institutional aspects of union behavior and managerialresponse,
the impact of unions on productivity growth is an empirical question. I turn
now to a survey of existing evidence, all of which comes from the manufacturing
sector.8
III. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE FROM MANUFACTURING
Only two studies have focused on the effects of unionization on productivity
growth. Hirsch and Link (1984) found slower productivity growth in industries
where percentage unionized is high and in those where that percentage is
rising. Freeman and Medoff (1984) found no correlation between unionization
and productivity growth in three different samples. There is, however,
additional evidence on this question in a number of other studies where,
although the emphasis has been on estimating the impact of R&D on productivity
growth, percentage unionized has.been included as a control variable. The
samples in some of these studies are almost identical to that used by Hirsch
and Link and to one of the samples used by Freeman and Medoff. Thus
examination of their findings not only provides a wider base of evidence, but
also serves as an independent check on the robustness of the Hirsch and Link
and the Freeman and Medoff results.
The results of all studies of productivity growth which include unionization
as a right-hand variable are summarized in Table 1. All of the studies are
limited to manufacturing and are grouped in Table 1 according to whether they
use data on industries (at various levels of aggregation) or firms. For each
study the table describes the sample, reports the measures of productivity and
unionization, lists the control variables, and summarizes the results for the
union variable(s).
The studies summarized on the first four lines all use data sets consisting
of two-digit industries over various intervals. The first three of these
consistently find much slower average annual productivity growth in unionized
industries, with the estimates of the union-nonunion difference ranging between9
4 and 6 percentage points. Even at the lower bound, thisimplies that over an
18 year period there will be twice as muchproductivity growth in a nonunion
industry compared to a unionized industry, implying that unions anathematize
economic progress.
There are good reasons to question these findings. The resultsobtained by
Kendrick and Grossman for the change in unionization variableimply that a 10
percentage point increase in unionization results in 1.8 percent faster
productivity growth. Although they attribute this finding to multicollinearity
of the change in unionization with other variables, it couldjust as easily be
explained in terms of "shock effects" in cases where unionization isgrowing
and in terms of increased turnover and lower laborquality in cases where
unionization is falling. Also, Terleckyj's (1980) findings indicate thatthe
estimated effect of the initial level of unionization isvery sensitive to
which total factor productivity measure is used as thedependent variable. He
finds a significant negative union impact onproductivity growth for only two
out of four measures.
The biggest problem with these results lies in the nature of thedata. At
the two-digit SIC level of aggregation it is impossible to determine whether
unions directly reduce productivity growth or whether unionsare most likely to
be found in industries with limited opportunities for technicaladvancement.
Percentage unionized is highest in "smokestack" industries such as primary
metals, transportation equipment, and paper where the products and the
production process changed very little over the sample periods examined in
these studies. The only way to control for differences across industries in
opportunities for productivity growth is to construct a data set with some
predominantly union and some predominantly nonunion observations within each10
industrial category. This can be done by either using a finer level of
aggregation than the very crude two-digit level or breaking down the two-digit
industries by some other variable, such as location.
The remaining industry studies cited in Table 1 follow one of these two
strategies. Terleckyj (1984) breaks a few two-digit industries down into their
major three-digit components and finds significantly lower productivity growth
under unionism in only one out of three specifications --onewhere he includes
R&D embodied in purchased capital goods but excludes R&D spending. When the
latter R&D variable is included (with or without the embodied R&D measure), he
finds no link between unionism and productivity growth. In a sample of 138
three-digit industries, Sveikauskas and Sveikauskas (1982) find no correlation
between unionization and productivity growth in any of the seven equations they
report. Freeman and Medoff examine one sample of three-digit industries,
another sample of four-digit industries, and another consisting of two-digit
industries broken down by state or region. As noted earlier, in all three
cases they find slower productivity growth under unionism, but the relationship
is not statistically significant.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the industry studies surveyed
here is that there is little reason to believe that unions have acted as a
major obstacle to productivity growth in manufacturing. Although the sign of
the union coefficient is almost always negative, in the most careful studies
the estimated effect of unions is rather small and estimated with relatively
little precision.
The results of three studies using data sets consisting of individual firms
or lines of business within a firm are reported on the last three lines of
Table 1. This type of data provides another way to obtain observations by11
union status within a particular industry, thusallowing independent variation
in unionism and technological opportunities. Thisflexibility is obtained at
the cost of limiting the sample to large, publicly traded firmsand, in some
cases, measuring unionization inaccurately. Two studies by Link find
dramatically slower productivity growth in firms which seem to bepredominantly
unionized. Link's measure of unionization in both of these studies is
percentage unionized in the three-digit industry in which the firm mainly
operates. His samples are limited to a small number of industries, all of
which have average to above average levels of unionization. Clarkand
Griliches find productivity grows at a one percent faster rateunder unionism,
but the union coefficient is the same size as its standarderror. Thus, the
studies using data on firms also fail to provideany conclusive evidence that
unions have any direct effect on productivity growth.
One indirect mechanism not considered inany of the studies summarized in
Table 1 may be quite important. Connolly, Hirsch, andHirschey (1986) report
evidence from a sample of 367 firms from the Fortune 500 that investmentin R&D
adds less to the market value of firms in unionized industriesand that firms
in those industries respond to this by investing in less R&D. Thismeans that
holding R&D intensity constant in an OLS equationmay not be the appropriate
method for estimating the total impact of unionizationon productivity growth.
By failing to consider this indirect effect, the studies surveyed abovemay
very well be underestimating the total impact of unionization. Further work
with more broadly representative data sets is clearly needed to establishthe
robustness of Connolly, Hirsch and Hirschey's findings withrespect to union
effects on R&D and how this influences estimates of the unionimpact on
productivity growth.12
IV. NEW EVIDENCE FOR MANUFACTURING
Because of the absence of any firmconclusionson the links between unionism
and productivity growth in the studies surveyed above, this issue was
re-examined over a sample of 74 three and four digit industries for which
U.S. Department of Labor (1986) reports indexes of output per employee hour
between 1972 and 1983. Besides not being used in any previous study focusing
on unionization and productivity growth, this data set merits examination
because the output measures are based mainly on physical quantities, which
should make them extremely accurate, and because it covers a more recent time
period, one where union density has been declining rapidly.
The percentage growth in the labor productivity index in each industry is
assumed to be a function of R&D intensity, four-firm concentration ratio, and
unionization. Scherer (1984) constructed two measures of 1974 R&D activity:
one indicating R&D originating in each industry and a second indicating
R&D used by each industry. The second measure was obtained by using an
input-output table to estimate how much of the R&D originating in a particular
industry was used in other sectors. Each measure of R&D spending was converted
into a measure of R&D intensity by dividing it by value added in 1974, as
reported in the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Both the initial level and the
change in the concentration and unionization variables were included as
right-hand side variables. The concentration ratios come from the Censusesof
Manufacturing for 1972 and 1982. The initial level of unionization is the
value reported by Freeman and Medoff for production workers from the pooled May
1973-75 CPS tapes; the final level was estimated by the author from the May13
1983 CPS pension supplement public use tape. The results are reported in Table
2.
Productivity growth is strongly related to concentration and R&D in this
sample, but it is unrelated to unionization. Productivity tends to grow
slightly faster in industries with high initial levels of unionization and
markedly faster in industries where percentage union is declining most rapidly,
but neither coefficient is statistically significant in any specification. In
results not reported in Table 2, the equations were re-estimated with union
variables calculated across all occupations; the union coefficients were even
smaller. This new evidence re-enforces the main conclusion from the previous
studies surveyed in Section III --thereis no direct connection between
unionization and productivity growth in manufacturing.
One limitation of this analysis is that it holds R&D intensity constant,
whereas the models discussed in Section II imply that unions could reduce
R&D. Even when R&D intensity is dropped from the model in column 6 of Table 2,
there is no relationship between unionization and productivity growth. To test
the linkage between R&D and unionization directly, each R&D intensity measure
was regressed on unionization and the concentration ratio. The results,
reported in Table 3, show that unionized industries spend much less money on
R&D. The ratio of R&D originating to output is 12 percentage points less in an
industry where all production workers belong to unions than in an industry
where none do. The ratio of R&D used to output is 17 percentage points lower
in unionized than nonunion industries. Increased concentration is associated
with higher R&D spending in this sample.
Both union coefficients are dramatically larger than the mean of the
dependent variable and, if taken literally, imply the mean ratio of R&D to14
output in unionized industries is negative. This suggests that the model is
overly simple. There are many important variables which remain to be
considered, along with different possible routes of causation. Nonetheless,
the results are very consistent with those of Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey
and point to the need for more careful analysis of the union-R&D-productivity
link in the future.
V. EVIDENCE FROM THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Construction is widely thought of as an industry in which very little
technological progress has been made and where there are very limited
opportunities for future productivity growth. Goverrinient statistics
systematically overstate the growth of prices in the industry because they
assume prices grow at the same rate as a weighted average of wages and material
costs, disregarding the relationship between wages and productivity. This
understatement of productivity growth is partly responsible for the perception
that there has been little progress, along with the popular wisdom that the
jobs of painters, plumbers, electricians, and carpenters have not changed in at
least 30 years. Interestingly, productivity growth in construction was above
the nonmanufacturing average between 1948 and 1968. Allen (1985) shows that
much of the alleged decline in construction productivity since then is
attributable to biases in the data.
Tatum (1984) cites two major sources of innovation in construction. One is
changes in the design of projects so that they can be built with less labor or
materials. The other is changes in the construction process itself. This can
include: "(1) development of new construction methods or sequences; (2)15
application or extension of methods or techniques originally developed to meet
other requirements; (3) development and application of new equipment and tools;
and (4) scale-up or refinement of existing methods." (Tatum, pp. 311-2) For
instance, a case study of the highway construction industry by Koch and
Moavenzadeh (1979) shows that the main source of productivity growth in that
sector between the 1950s and the l970s was improvements in equipment. They
attribute this to competition among equipment manufacturers, changes in highway
design including some standardization of certain features, relatively stable
demand (because of the use of user fees to fund highway construction and
repair), and the increased price of labor relative to capital. Rosefielde and
Mills (1979) cite other sources of productivity growth in the construction
industry, including the widespread adoption of power tools and machinery,
introduction of larger lifting and moving machinery, changes in the use of
building materials which economize on labor time (such as drywall for plaster,
movable partitions for walls), and increased use of prefabricated components.
Where do these innovations come from? It is quite clear that they do not
come from R&D done by firms in the construction industry itself. Scherer
estimates that these firms do only $28 million a year, a small amount compared
to the size of the industry. A study recently completed for the Building
Research Board of the National Research Council (1986) also found very little
government spending on R&D related to construction. One potentially important
factor is R&D embodied in capital goods and materials purchased by the
construction industry. Scherer estimates that R&D spending by companies in all
industries which is used by companies in construction amounts to $432.9
million.16
The predominance of craft as opposed to industrial unionism in construction
makes this industry an especially interesting case to consider for examining
how unions affect productivity growth. Unions are most likely to influence
productivity growth in construction through relative factor prices and work
rules. The small amount of R&D done by firms in the construction industry
makes it unlikely that this route of union influence is very important.
Pooled data from the 1972, 1977, and 1982 Censuses of Construction
Industries are used here to estimate the effect of unions on productivity
growth in construction. There are separate observations in each year for three
two-digit industries and 27 states or regions identified in the May 1973-75
Current Population Survey (CPS). The 1972 data set is the same as that in
Allen (1984) and the 1977 and 1982 data sets are constructed in exactly the
same way. The May 1977-78 CPS is used to estimate percentage unionized and
labor quality for 1977; the May 1979-81 CPS, for 1982.
The productivity variable used in Table 4 is the change in the log of total
factor productivity. Total factor productivity is the ratio of output to a
weighted average of capital and labor inputs. The weights in each year equal
the input shares in that year. To convert monetary to real values, variables
were deflated to 1972 dollars. The output measure used below is value added.
It was deflated by the deflator for construction industry GNP in the national
income accounts and by the Dodge Cost Index (where New York City =100).These
adjustments control for differences across states or regions in price levels in
1972 and the rates of price increase since 1972. The capital variable equals
the sum of (1) the service flow from owned capital and (2) expenditures on
rented machinery and structures. It was deflated with an index of durable
equipment prices, weighted by the share of each type of equipment in17
construction, as reported by Boddy and Gort (1971). The weights for education,
age, occupation and region in the labor quality index are all based on wage
equation coefficients for nonunion workers (with separate coefficients for men
and women) from the 1977-78 CPS. This removed year-to-year variation inwage
equation coefficients as a source of labor quality variation.
Estimates of equations (1) and (3) are reported in Table 4, along withan
extension of (3) where productivity growth is also allowed to be a function of
the initial levels of average establishment size and laborquality (denoted
(3') in the table). The model was also estimated (1) under the assumption of
constant factor shares and (2) with labor productivity as the dependent
variable. These results were the same as those in Table 4 and are not
reported. The estimates of (1) show that productivity growth is slower in
state by industry cells where unionization is growing, but the coefficient is
smaller than its standard error.
Two stronger conclusions emerge from the estimates of (3). First,
productivity growth is much slower in areas with high levels of unionization.
The Union-nonunion difference in productivity growth, in terms of annualrates
of change and assuming no productivity growth under unionism, is between 3.8
and 5.3 percent. Second, productivity growth is also much slower inareas
where the proportion of union workers is rising. The change in unionization
coefficient falls from. -.173 in the estimate of (1) to -.456 in (3). The
level of unionization and the change in unionization coefficients are both
economically and statistically significant, implying that the specification in
(3) is to be preferred to that in (1). To test whether the initial level of
unionization is acting as a proxy for initial levels of other variables which
might contribute to productivity growth, (3) was extended to include the18
initial values of the labor quality index and average establishment size.
Inclusion of these two variables caused the coefficient of the initial level of
unionization to drop even further from -.375to -.516.
Do the results in Table 4 reflect a one-time shock to c as described in (2)
or do they indicate different trends in productivity growth as described in
(3)? One way to distinguish these two interpretations is to estimate the model
over shorter periods and see if the results are the same in each period. If
they are, this would indicate that the results should be interpreted in terms
of a trend rather than a single shock. The market share of union contractors
was falling between 1972 and 1982, but Allen (1986) shows that the rate of
decline was steepest after 1977. Also, 1982 was the last year of an extended
period of depressed output in construction. To test the robustness of the
results in terms of stability over different periods, separate models were
estimated for 1972-1977 and 1977-1982. The results, in the last six columns of
Table 4, show only one important difference between the two periods. Whereas
the initial level of unionization is inversely related to productivity growth
in both periods, the relationship between changes in unionization and
productivity growth holds up for 1977-1982 but not for 1972-1977. This
probably results from either the relatively modest drop in unionization in the
earlier period or greater variation in the change in unionization in the later
period.
If the means of the dependent variables are taken seriously, these results
imply that productivity was falling in both the union and nonunion sectors over
this period. Most of this alleged productivity decline results from
overestimation of the rate of price increase in construction and the absence of
any controls for changes in the mix of construction, as discussed in Allen19
(1985). Once adjustments are made for these factors, the change in
productivity over this period is negligible. If the rate of productivity
growth for the industry is assumed to be zero, the estimates of the
union-nonunion difference in productivity growth in Table 4 stillimply that
productivity was falling in union construction while rising in nonunion
construction.
There are no obvious sources of declining productivity in unionconstruction
over this period. Strike activity has fallen since 1975, indicating no
deterioration in labor-management relations akin to that in the coalindustry.
There was no change in this period in the share of workers coveredby
agreements limiting or prohibiting subcontracting, limiting or regulating crew
size, and restricting work by those outside the bargaining unit. Thus, the
possibility that productivity in union construction stayed constant, rather
than declining, should not be ruled out. The results in Table 4 would then
imply very rapid productivity growth in nonunion construction.
Regardless of whether productivity in union construction was constant or
falling during this period, there is still the question of why the produc-
tivity gap between union and nonunion construction narrowed. Most construc-
tion-related R&D is done in industries which supply materials andequipment to
construction firms. The growth in capital input or the change in the
capital-labor ratio is the best available signal of this form of innovative
activity in the CCI data. Although included as a control variable in Table 4,
one could reasonably argue that to estimate the true impact of unionism,
capital must be viewed as an endogenous variable in a system of equations.
To test this, both the change in capital input and the change in the
capital-labor ratio were regressed on the exogenous variables in equation (3')20
over the same sample used in Table 4. The strongest correlate of the change
in capital and the change in the capital-labor ratio across region-industry
cells was the change in labor quality, which had a negative coefficient. The
change in unionization and the initial level of unionization coefficients were
smaller than their standard errors in both equations. Thus, the change in
capital in the CCI data not seem to be directly linked with the unionization
patterns in the CPS data.
A question which cannot be addressed with these data is how to interpret
the results in light of the growing share of union workers who seem to be
working for nonunion contractors and the growing share of union contractors
which have opened nonunion subsidiaries. For instance, the data on capital
input indicate that union contractors have invested just as much as nonunion
contractors. This finding can be misleading if the union contractors put most
of their new capital into their nonunion "double-breasted" subsidiaries.
A number of labor-market related causes of the decline in the union-nonunion
productivity difference are discussed in some detail in Allen (1986). The
rising share of union members working in the open shop seems to have eroded the
training advantage which union contractors once possessed over their nonunion
competition. It is also likely that the high unemployment rates observed
during much of this period significantly eroded the search economies offered by
union hiring halls.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the ways in which unions can affect productivity
growth and presented evidence from manufacturing and construction. While cross
section studies which estimate union-nonunion differences in productivity21
levels frequently find productivity to be higher under unionism, the results
reported here show that unionism has little effect on productivity growth in
construction. The main reason for the difference in the results between
manufacturing and construction probably lies in the dominance of the craft form
of unionization in construction. As noted by Slichter, Healy, and Livernash,
the introduction of changes in the work place is much more costly under this
form of unionism and this makes innovation less likely to occur.
There is evidence that the building trades unions are aware of this problem
and have begun to do something about it. In a number of areas contractors and
unions have formed cooperative associations to generate productivity
improvements. In St. Louis PRIDE (Productivity and Responsibility Increase
Development and Employment) was launched in 1972. This group, which also
includes owners, engineers, architects, and equipment and materials suppliers,
has been so successful that employment of union craftsmen has actually
increased by 35 percent and the open shop has made little headway in that
area. In 1982 the AFL-CIO Building Trades Department and the National
Construction Employers Council launched a "Market Recovery Program for Union
Construction" which aims to emulate this approach nationwide. The results of
these efforts will determine whether the effect of unions on productivity
change can vary over time in a particular industry, an issue beyond the scope
of this paper but which should be examined in future work.22
Table 1. Studies of Unictiizaticn and Productivity Change in Manufacturing.
Measure of
ProductivityMeasure of
Change andUnionizationCctrol ThçactofUnicttlzatiai on
Study Sample Source and Source Variables AnnualProductivity Growth
Studies using industry data
1. Kendrick and 20 2-digit, Own Level:K (1973) R&D, CR, 3.6 percent slowerunder
Grossman (1980) 1948-76 Change: own FEM, CAPUTIL unionism; 1.8percentfaster
whereunionshare rises by 1
percentagepoints
2. Mansfield(1980) 20 2-digit, K (1973) Level: K (1973) R&D C&I' 5.4 to 6.1 percentslower
1948-66 under unionism
3.Hirsch and LInk 19 2-digit, KG (1980)&Level: FM (1979)R&D, CR, WF, 3.6 to 4.4 percent slower
(1984) 1957-73 G.J (1980) Change:FM (1979)CYC under unionism and 0.5to0.
percentslower where union
share rises by 10 percentage
points
4. Terleckyj (1980) 20 2-digit,a. K (1973)Level: own R&D CAT, PVT,a. 4 percent slower under
1948-66 CYC unionism
b. GJ b. insIgnificant 3 percent
slower under unictiism
c. Revised GJ c.3percent slower under unin
d. KG (1980) d. insIgnificant 2 percent
slower under unionism
5. Terleckyj(1984) 27 2 and GL (1984) Level:FM (1979) a. R&D a. InsIgnificant 0.5percent
3-digit, slower under unionism
1969-76 b. FMBR&Db.1.0percent slowerunder
c. R&D, lBc. Insignificant 0.5 percent
R&D slowerunderunionism
6.Sveikauskasand 138 3-digit,Own Level:FM(1979) DY,SIZE, R&D, Insignificant.44 percent
Sveikauskas (1982) 1959-1969 CR slowerto.01 percent
faster under unionism
7. Freeman and a. 176 3-digit Own Level: FM (1979) a. InsIgnificant .4 percent
Medoff (1984) 1958-76 slower under unionism
b. 450 4-digit G(1984) I.evel: FM (1979) b. Insignificant .3 percent
1958-78 slower under unionism
c. 341 2-digit Own Level: own c. Insignificant .3 percent






thange and Unimizatici Ccittrol Iiract ofUnlra-iizaticnai





Level: FM (1979)R&D CAT 2.5 percent slower under
uniroism
8. Link (1981)
9. Link (1982) 97 firmsIn Own
3industries,
1975-79






10. Clarkand 924 "businesses"Own Level: own R&D, R&D CAT,insiificant 1percent Griliches(1984) in PDEdata,
1970-1980
GAPUTII, REChigher under unicoism
tes: Dependentvariable is growth in total factor productivity growth except for Freeman and Meduff,which uses
growthto labor productivity. AU results for iqact of unir*dzaticn are statistically siificant at cventiroaily
accepted cctfidence levels unless otherwise noted.
Key to sources of productivity and unicmlzatfrn msasures:
FM =Freemanand Medoff G.J0o1iop and Jorgensen K =Kendrick
CCray CL Griliches and LichtenbergKG =Kendrickand Grossmsn
Key to caitrol variables:
CAPUI'IL =Capacityutilizatiai ratio FMB R&D =R&Dembodied incapital R&D CAT =R&Dintensity coefficient
goods pirchased fran other allowed to 'vary for
industries different categories for
CR. =Ccncentratiairatio
F1 =Percentageferele loyees REC =Newnessof capital stock
CYC =Indexof cyclical Instability of Fir =Shareof sales to S]ZE Shares of irkers infirms
Industry c*itpit Txxgoverrmntai. buyers with 500 or lessand 2500
or nre rkers
DY=OutWtgrowth R&D =Ratioof total R&D to outpitTable 2. Labor Productivity Growth
Industries 1972-83.
Equations, 74 3 and 4-Digit Manufacturing
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(S.D.)
Constant 1.045 .956 .936 .868 .937 1.016
(.059) (.124) (.098) (.141) (.135) (.125)
Unionization .505 .186 .155 .096 -.009
1973-75 (.139) (.229) (.229) (.230) (.221)
Change in
unionization, -.116 -.705 -.668 -.457 -.381
1973-75 to 1983 (.060) (.510) (.515) (.508) (.509)
Concentration .388 .386 .360 .437 .412 .373 .416
ratio in 1972 (.217) (.131) (.135) (.135) (.141) (.146) (.144)
Change in
concentration, -.003 1.194 1.236 1.170 1.206 1.273 1.340
1972-82 (.060) (.484) (.488) (.481) (.486) (.492) (.494)
R&D intensity .028 .831 1.003 1.067 1.197
by use (.056) (.508) (.551) (.533) (.568)
R&D intensity .036 .954
by origin (.048) (.652)
a .240 .240 .238 .239 .243 .245
R2 .195 .203 .217 .222 .196 .171
The mean (S.D.) of the dependent variable is 1.214 (.262).
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Table 3. R&D Intensity Equations, 74 3 and 4-Digit Manufacturing Industries,
1974.
Dependent Variable
Ratio of R&D Originating Ratio of R&D Used






ratio in 1972 (.025) (.030)
a .045 .052
.141 .161
Mean (S.D.) of .036 .028
dependent (.048) (.056)
variable26
Table 4. change n Total Factor ProductivityEquatictis.
SanlePeriod and Equaticti
1972-1982 1972-1977 1977-1982
(1) (3) (3') (1) (3) (3') (1) (3) (3')
Intercept -.289-.160 -1.187 -.142 -.098-1.210 -.160-.060 -.352
(.028) (.055) (.611) (.021) (.044)(.487) (.025) (.060) (.596)
Change In -.173-.456 -.451 .082 .003 .005 -.160-.303 -.320
tinion (.200) (.220) (.217) (.144) (.159)(.156) (.168)(.182) (.194)
ChangeIn -.475-.739 -.515 -.503 -.484-.128 .206-.007 .097
laborquality (.489) (.480) (.527) (.352) (.352) (.378) (.380) (.391) (.440)
Change In
estab1Lshnnt.844 .808 .845 .794 .799 .809 .795 .722 .717
size (.127) (.123) (.122) (.122) (.121) (.117) (.133) (.137) (.142)
Initial level -.375 -.516 -.126 -.304 -.277 -.321
ofunion (.140) (.158) (.110) (.134) (.150) (.175)
Initial level .584 .636 .196
oflaborquality (.386) (.313) (.379)
Initial level
of establisbnnt .057 .067 -.004
size (.034) (.028) (.034)
a .198 .190 .187 .159 .159 .152 .186 .184 .186
.371 .426 .459 .370 .381 .445 .329 .358 .361
Mean(S.D.)
of dependent-.304-.304 -.304 -.196 -.196-.196 -.108-.108 -.108
variable (.245) (.245) (.245) (.196) (.196)(.196) (.223)(.223) (.223)27
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